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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark C. Hunter appeals from the district court's appellate decision reversing
the magistrate's order that granted Hunter's motion to suppress evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
As found by the magistrate, the parties below stipulated to the following facts:
On April 16th 2011 at three minutes after midnight [Hunter] was
stopped at Eighth and Myrtle for driving without headlights. There was
the odor of alcohol and the defendant admitted drinking three vodka
tonics between 7:30 and 10:30. Officer Robert Gibson responded and
conducted three field sobriety tests. [Hunter] failed the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, but passed the one leg stand and the walk and turn
tests. [Hunter] was then arrested and submitted to a breath test which
resulted in readings of .090 and .088.
(R., p.60.) The parties below also stipulated to the following additional facts, which

are set forth in Officer Gibson's police report:
On 4/16/11 at 0003 hours, Officer Lacow stopped a vehicle for driving
without headlights at Myrtle and 8th . Officer Lacow requested a STEP
assist and [Officer Gibson] responded for the STEP assist.
Officer Lacow identified the driver as Mark Hunter by his Idaho driver's
license. Officer Lacow stated that he observed the vehicle come from
the parking garage at gth and Front without headlights. Officer Lacow
stated that the vehicle continued southbound on gth and turned
eastbound on Myrtle still without lights. Officer Lacow stated he
stopped the vehicle at Myrtle and 8th . The passenger was identified as
Carrie Pereira.
Officer Lacow stated that he could smell the odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from the vehicle and [Hunter] admitted to drinking.
Officer Lacow stated he checked [Hunter's] eyes for nystagmus while
[Hunter] [was] seated in the driver's seat. Officer Lacow stated he did
observe nystagmus in [Hunter's] eyes.
[Officer Gibson] had [Hunter] step out of the vehicle to conduct
standardized field sobriety tests on the sidewalk. [Hunter] stated he

1

was coming from Fatty's and was on his way home. [Hunter] stated
that he was at Owest Arena for the MMA fights earlier that night.
[Hunter] stated he consumed [three] Vodka tonics that night.[1] [Hunter]
stated that he had the beverages between 1930 and 2230 hours,
While speaking to [Hunter], [Officer Gibson] could smell the odor of an
alcoholic beverage coming from his person. [The officer] noticed that
[Hunter's] eyes were glassy and bloodshot. [Hunter] stated that he
was not taking any medications and did not have any physical
impairments. [Hunter] stated he did not have any recent head injuries
or eye problems.
[Officer Gibson] conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Both
of [Hunter's] eyes did not pursue smoothly, had distinct and sustained
nystagmus at maximum deviation and nystagmus onset before 45
degrees. [2]

[Officer Gibson] asked [Hunter] if he was comfortable with the shoes
he was wearing. [Hunter] stated that he was. [Officer Gibson]
instructed and demonstrated the walk and turn test. [Hunter] did not
score any errors on the test.
[Officer Gibson] instructed and demonstrated the one leg stand test.
[Hunter] swayed during the test.
[Officer Gibson] checked [Hunter's] eyes a second time and he had the
same scoring errors as the first time.
[Officer Gibson] advised [Hunter] that [the officer] was requiring
[Hunter] to give [the officer] a breath sample. [The officer] placed
[Hunter] in handcuffs. [The officer] placed [Hunter] in the back of [the
officer's] patrol vehicle. While [Hunter] was in the back of [the] vehicle,
[the officer] checked his mouth for any foreign substances and did not
find any. [The officer] advised [Hunter] not to burp, belch, or vomit for
the fifteen minute waiting period. [The officer] played the ALS audio
recording. After the fifteen minute waiting period, [the officer] had
[Hunter] blow into the Lifeloc instrument. [Hunter] blew .090/.088 ....

The police report actually indicates Hunter stated he consumed "four Vodka
tonics." (R., p.68.) However, the parties stipulated below that Hunter "admitted
consuming a total of three Vodka tonics and/or cocktails instead of four." (R., p.63.)
1

At the suppression hearing, Officer Gibson testified he gave Hunter a score of six
out of six points on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. (SH Tr., p.17, Ls.12-25; see
also R., p.71.)
2

2

(R., p.68; see also R., p.63-65 (written stipulation); Tr., p.8, L.17 - p.12, L.10 (oral

stipulation).)
The state charged Hunter with driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), a
second offense.

(R., p.6.)

Hunter moved to suppress the breath test results,

contending they were "obtained as the result of an investigatory detention that
exceeded the scope allowed by Idaho law."

(R., p.43; see also R., p.34 (,,[T]he

warrantless detention exceeded the scope allowed during a traffic stop ... ").)
Following a hearing, the magistrate reframed the issue as follows:
It is clear the breath test was obtained after the defendant's arrest.
The investigative detention had ended at that point. If the arrest was
supported by probable cause the breath test is admissible. If the arrest
was not supported by probable cause the breath test is a product of an
illegal arrest and must be suppressed.
(R., p.61.)

Ultimately, the magistrate found probable cause lacking and granted

Hunter's motion to suppress.
district court, which reversed.

(R., pp.60-62.)

The state timely appealed to the

(R., pp.3-4, 77-81, 83, 140-50.)

appealed. (R., pp.151-53.)
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Hunter timely

ISSUE
Hunter states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Judge err in reversing the order of the
magistrate?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Hunter failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision
reversing the magistrate court's order suppressing evidence and remanding for
further proceedings?
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ARGUMENT
Hunter Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision
Reversing The Magistrate's Order Suppressing Evidence
A.

Introduction
The district court reversed the magistrate's order granting Hunter's motion to

suppress, ruling that, before he administered the breath test to Hunter, "Officer
Gibson possessed information that would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that Hunter had
been driving under the influence. In other words, Officer Gibson had probable cause
to arrest Hunter for [DUll." (R., pp.147-48.) Hunter challenges the district court's
decision, arguing as he did below that, once Hunter passed the walk and turn and
one-leg stand field sobriety tests, the officer no longer had any basis to suspect,
much less probable cause to believe, that Hunter was driving under the influence of
alcohol. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-11.) Hunter's arguments fail. Correct application of
the law to the facts of this case supports the district court's conclusion that the
totality of the information known to the officer gave him probable cause to arrest
Hunter for DUI.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 Ct. App. 2008)
(citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). When a decision
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
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findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
302,160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

Correct Application Of The Law To The Facts Shows Officer Gibson Had
Probable Cause To Arrest Hunter For DUI
"Warrantless arrests made upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth

Amendment." State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346,349, 194 P.3d 550, 553 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Virginia v. Moore, _

U.S. _ , 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008)).

"Probable cause for an arrest is not measured by the same level of proof required for
conviction." Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citation omitted). Rather,
probable cause only "requires that the police possess information that would lead a
person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that a crime has been committed by the arrestee." State v. Finnicum, 147
Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The probable
cause determination "depends upon the totality of the circumstances and the
assessment of probabilities in the particular factual context." Finnicum, 147 Idaho at
140,206 P.3d at 504 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003)). The
facts upon which the probable cause finding is based are evaluated objectively and
must take into account the officers' expertise and experience. Finnicum, 147 Idaho
at 140, 206 P.3d at 504 (citing State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d
1059, 1062-63 (1996)); Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citing State v.
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct. App. 1991)).
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Application of the foregoing standards to the undisputed facts of this case
shows Hunter has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred in
reversing the magistrate's order granting his motion to suppress.

As correctly

summarized by the state below, the evidence presented in relation to Hunter's
suppression motion established the following facts that, viewed in their totality,
support the district court's conclusion that Officer Gibson had probable cause to
arrest Hunter for DUI:
Hunter had driven several blocks without headlights in the dark at 0003
hours. [R, p.68.] Officer Gibson knew that the officer who initially
stopped Hunter could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the open
driver's side window of the vehicle and that Hunter admitted to drinking
earlier that evening. [Id.] He also knew that the officer that initially
stopped Hunter had observed nystagmus in Hunter's eyes while
Hunter was still seated in his vehicle. [Id.] Officer Gibson corroborated
the initial officer's observations by also noting the odor of alcoholic
beverage coming from the vehicle and noting that Hunter's eyes were
glassy and bloodshot. [Id.] After Hunter exited his vehicle, Officer
Gibson could smell the odor of alcohol coming from Hunter's person.
[Id.] He learned that Hunter was coming from Fatty's Bar, had
previously been at the Mixed Martial Arts fights that evening, and was
on his way home. [Id.] Hunter told the officer that he had consumed
three vodka tonics that night between the 1930 and 2230 hours (7:30
p.m. - 10:30 p.m.). [Id.] Hunter also stated that he was not taking any
medications, did not have any physical impairments, and did not have
any recent head injuries or eye problems. [Id.] Hunter failed the HGN
test, showing 6 out of6 signs of impairment. [Id.; S.H. Tr., p.17, Ls.1225.] Hunter swayed during the one-leg stand test. [R, p.68; SH Tr.,
p.18, Ls.5-7.] Hunter did not score any errors on the walk and turn
test.
[R, p.68; SH Tr., p.18, Ls.1-4.] Officer Gibson then readministered the HGN test, which Hunter again failed. [R, p.68.]
When all of these facts are considered collectively, the officer
possessed probable cause to arrest Hunter for driving while under the
influence of alcohol.
(R, pp.113-14; see also R., pp.146-47 (district court's Memorandum Decision and

Order reciting many of the same facts as collectively supplying the officer with
probable cause to arrest Hunter for DUI).)
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Hunter challenges the district court's finding of probable cause, arguing as he
did below that "Idaho law requires that if an individual passes the SFSTs, absent
something 'unique,' the reasonable suspicion for his continued investigatory
detention is dispelled." (Appellant's brief, pp.8-11.) As correctly noted by the state
below, none of the cases Hunter cites support this proposition.
135.)

(See R., pp.131-

Rather than repeat the well-researched and well-reasoned arguments set

forth in the state's briefing before the district court, the state hereby adopts the
arguments advanced by the state below and incorporates them by reference herein.
For this Court's convenience, a copy of the state's Reply Brief on appeal to the
district court is attached to this brief as Appendix A.

The state also adopts and

incorporates by reference herein the district court's analysis as set forth at pages 5
through 9 of its Memorandum Decision and Order. (See R., pp.144-48.) For this
Court's convenience, a copy of the district court's appellate decision is attached to
this brief as Appendix B.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
appellate decision reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence and
remanding this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of November, 2013.

Deputy Attorney Gene al
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COMES NOW, the Appellant by and through' Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Assistant City
Attorney, and hereby files its Reply Brief in the above-captioned matter.
. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
The Trial Court Erred In Granting Hunter's Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The trial court erred when it granted HU11ter's motion to suppress, concluding that

Hunter's arrest was not supported by probable cause. The court erred because the evidence
presented was more than sufficient to supply probable cause to arrest for DUL Hunter asserts
that the trial court was correct in its ruling, arguing that "if a suspect passes the field sobriety
tests, the officer's reasonable suspicion of a law violation is dispelled." (Respondent's brief, p.
3.) He further misconstrues the state's argument and writes, "the state's assertion that the fact
which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion can also give rise to probable cause to arrest even if the
suspect passes the field sobriety tests is incorrect and contrary to two decades of case law."
(Respondent's brief, p. 4.) The state contends that Hunter's arguments must fail, however,
because they are without merit and contrary to the law.

B.

The Trial Court Erred When It Granted Hunter's Motion To Suppress
Hunter asserts, "1) If a person is suspected of operating a vehicle while under the

influence of alcohol, the field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means to confirm or dispel the
officer's suspicion; and 2) If a suspect passes the field sobriety tests, the officer's reasonable
./

suspicion of a law violation is ,dispelled." (Respondent's brief, p. 3.) This is simply not the law.
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In support of the proposition that field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means to
confirm or dispel the offi.cer's suspicion whether an individual is driving under the influence,
Hunter cites four cases. However, nothing in the four cases that Hunter cites stands for the
proposition that an individual must perform field sobriety tests, or that satisfactory performance
on those tests negates the other facts which an officer has ih his possession. For example, Hunter
cites State v. Jones, 115 Idaho 1029,772 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1989), for the proposition that "the
request to perform field sobriety tests is a reasonable attempt by the officer to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion that the driver was driving while under the
influence."

(Respondent's brief, p. 2.)

The actual sentence from the case reads, "This

questioning, including the officer request that Jones perform field sobriety tests, were reasonable
attempts by the officer to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions."
Jones, 115 Idaho at 1033, 772 P.2d at 240 (internal citation omitted). Thus, contrary to Hunter's
assertion, the court does not look only at field sobriety tests in making its determination but also
looks at questioning and other factors.
Likewise, Hunter cites State v. Ferreira, 113 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999)
and State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P .3d 216 (Ct. App. 2008), for the proposition that field
sobriety tests are the least intrusive means reasonably available in a short timeframe to
reasonable confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion. (Respondent's brief, p. 3.) While the state
does not dispute this statement, it is. important to note that in neither case did the court hold that
field sobriety tests were the only way to confirm or dispel an officer's suspicion of DUI or that
an officer could not use his common sense judgment and look to other factors' in deciding that
probable cause existed to arrest. Importantly, none of these cases hold that an officer must
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·
ignore other indicia of being under the influence simply because an individual performs
satisfactorily on one field sobriety test.
Probable cause to arrest for DUI may exist even if an individual does not perform field
sobriety tests and probable cause to arrest may exist on lesser facts than those in present in the
instant case. See State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct.App.2009)
(officers had probable cause to arrest where defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her
speech, had'bloodshot eyes, seemed confused, and a witness opined she was highly intoxic:ated);
State v. Martinez-Gonzal~z, 152 Idaho 775, --, 275 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2012) (officers had
probable cause to arrest where 1) officers observed open beer cans in defendant's vehicle, 2)
'defendant had slightly glazed eyes and slurred speech, 3) an odor of alcohol was present, 4)
defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, 4)' defendant drove his vehicle immediately after
officers told him not to drive). Here, evidence existed beyond that which a court found sufficient
to support probable cause in Finnicum or Martinez-Gonzalez: Hunter had driven several blocks
without headlights in the dark at 0003 hours. Officer Gibson knew that the officer who initially
stopped Hunter could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the open driver's side window of
the vehicle and that Hunter admitted to drinking earlier that evening. He also knew that the
officer that initially stopped Hunter had observed nystagmus in Hunter's eyes while Hunter was
still seated in his vehicle. Officer Gibson corroborated the initial officer's observations by also
noting the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and noting that Hunter's eyes
were glassy and bloodshot. After Hunter exited his vehicle, Officer Gibson could smell the odor
of alcohol coming from Hunter's person. He learned that Hunter was coming from Fatty's Bar,
had previously been at the Mixed Martial ;Arts fights that evening, and was on his way home.
~
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Hunter told the officer that he had consumed three vodka tomcs that night between the 1930 and
2230 hours (7:30 p.m. - 10:30 p.m.). Hunter also stated that he was not taking any medications,
did not have any physical impairments, and did not have any recent head injuries or eye
problems. Hunter failed the HGN test, showing 6 out of 6 signs of impairment. Hunter swayed
during the one-leg stand test. Hunter did not score any errors on the walk and turn test. Officer
Gibson then re-administered the HGN test, which Hunter again failed.

These observations

provided more probable cause than found in either Finnicum or Martinez-Gonzalez.
Further, nothing requires an officer to disregard his observations simply because an

"
individual perfonns satisfactorily on some field sobriety tests. The trial court misconstrued the
holding of State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1991). In Garrett, the defendant
was administered seven field sobriety tests, including the HGN, on suspicion of DUI.

The

defendant refused a BAC test. At trial, the state presented testimony that despite there not being
a blow, the defendant's HGN test result was proof that he was over the legal limit. The Supreme
Court found that the admission of that testimony was error, but in light of the other FST results,
it was not reversible error. Garrett, 119 Idaho at 882, 811 at 492. The Court further held that an
HGN test result alone could not be correlated to a particular BAC level, and that although an
" ... HGN test result does supply probable cause for arrest, standing alone that result does not
provide prc;ofpositive of DUI, because many other factors may cause nystagmus." Garrett, 119
Idaho at 881, 811 at 491.

To hold, as the court did in Hunter, that Garrett stands for the

proposition that "[t]he HGN test is a reliable indicator of impairment only if corroborated by
other field sobriety tests" misconstrues the holding of that case. Rather, Garrett simply stands
for the proposition that the HGN test alone cannot be used to testify to a defendant's particular
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BAC level or used alone to show that the a defendant was "under the influence." Here, the state
is neither seeking to use the HGN test result at trial to have the officer·correlate it to a certain
BAC level, nor to use the HGN test as proof positive that Hunter was "under the influence."
Rather, the state is simply seeking to use the HGN test result as part of its probable cause
determination - a purpose which in no way is prohibited by the holding of Garrett.
The officer used the HGN test in conjunction with other tests and observations in
developing probable cause to arrest Hunter for DUI. The HGN test was consistent with the
officer's observation of the Hunter's bloodshot and glassy eyes, odor of alcohol, admissions,
traffic violation, and performance on the one-leg stand. Nothing in the law requires the officer to
disregard these factors simply because Hunter performed satisfactorily on the walk-and-tum test
and showed only one indicia of impairment on the one-leg stand. Probable cause requires an
examination of "all facts considered as a whole." State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 675, 678, 603 P.2d
1009, 1010 (1979). Because "all of the facts considered as a whole" give rise to probable cause
to arrest Hunter, this Court should reverse the trial court and hold that Hunter's arrest was
supported by probable cause.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above arguments, the Appellant requests this Court to reverse the trial
court and hold that Hunter's arrest was supported by probable cause.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH J1JDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintifflAppellant,
vs.

MARK C. HUNTER,
DefendantlRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-MD-2011-0005903
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

This is an appeal by the State of the magistrate's decision, Han. Kevin Swain, granting
the defendant's Mark Hunter's (Hunter's) motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth
hereinafter, the magistrate's decision will be reversed and this case remanded for further
proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The magistrate found the following facts in his December 6,2011 decision:
This is a motion to suppress the results of the defendant's breath test. The
parties have stipulated to the pertinent facts which are as follows: On April
16th 2011 at three minutes after midnight the defendant was stopped at Eighth
and Myrtle for driving without headlights. There was the odor of alcohol and
the defendant admitted drinking three vodka tonics between 7:30 and 10:30.
Officer Robert Gibson responded and conducted three field sobriety tests.
The defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, but passed the one
leg stand and the walk turn tests. The defendant was then arrested and
submitted to a breath test which resulted in readings of .090 and .088.
Decision and Order, at 1.
In addition, the following also appears to be undisputed:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -- PAGE 1
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Mark Hunter was arrested Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, second
offense, in violation ofIdaho Code §§ 18-8004(1)(a) and 18-8005(4) on April
16, 2011. He thereafter filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the
'warrantless detention exceed(ed) the scope allowed during a traffic stop
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.' The State
objected 'to the motion and the matter was set for a hearing. Prior to the
hearing, the parties entered the police report in the matter into evidence and
stipulated that the court could consider its contents in reaching its decision
regarding the motion to suppress. The report reads, in relevant part:
On 4/16111 at 0003 hours, Officer Lacow stopped a vehicle for
driving without headlights at Myrtle and gLn. Officer Lacow
requested a STEP assist and I responded for the STEP assist ...
Officer Lacow identified the driver as Mark Hunter by his Idaho
driver's license. Officer Lacow stated that he observed the vehicle
come from the parking garage at 9th and Front without headlights.
Officer Lacow stated that the vehicle continued southbound on 9th
and turned eastbound on Myrtle still without lights.
Officer Lacow stated that he stopped the vehicle at Myrtle and 8th .
The passenger was identified as Carrie Pereira.
Officer Lacow stated that he could smell the odor of alcoholic
beverage coming from the vehicle and Mark admitting to drinking.
Officer Lacow stated he checked Mark's eyes for nystagmus I while
Mark (was) seated in the driver's seat. Officer Lacow stated he did
observe nystagmus in Mark's eyes.
I had Mark step out of the vehicle to conduct standardized field
sobriety tests on the sidewalk. Mark stated he was coming from
Fatty's and was on his way home. Mark stated that he was at Quest
Arena for the MMA fights earlier that night. Mark stated he
consumed (three) Vodka tonics that night. 2 Mark stated that he had
the beverages between 1930 and 2230 hours. While speaking to
Mark, I could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from
his person. I noticed that Mark's eyes. were glassy and bloodshot.
Mark stated that he was not taking any medications and did not have

\

j"Gaze nystagmus [is] an involuntary movement of the eyeballs when the individual looks to the side, which is
evidence of intoxication." State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 731, 979 P.2d 128, 133 (Ct. App. 1999).
2"The police report reads that Mark consumed four Vodka tonics that night. However, the state and defense
stipulated that Mark told Officer Gibson be consumed three Vodka tonics that night." Appellant's Brief, at 2 n.l,
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any physical impairments. Mark stated he did not have any recent
head injuries or eye problems.
I conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Both of Mark's eyes
did not pursue smoothly, had distinct and sustained nystagmus at
maximum deviation and nystagmus onset before 45 degrees.
I asked Mark if he was comfortable with the shoes he was wearing.
Mark stated that he was. I instructed and demonstrated the walk and
turn test. Mark did not score any errors on the test.
I instructed and demonstrated the one leg stand test. Mark swayed
during the test.
I checked Mark's eyes a second time and he had the same scoring
errors as the first time.
I advised Mark that I was requiring him to give me a breath sample.
r placed Mark in handcuffs. I placed Mark in the back of my vehicle.
While Mark was in the back of my vehicle, I checked his mouth for
any foreign substances and did not find any. I advised Mark not to
burp, belch, or vomit for the fifteen minute waiting period, I had
Mark blow into the Lifeloc instrument. Mark blew .0901088. Mark
was advised of the results ...
I transported Mark to the Ada County Jail. Mark was charged with

DDI-2nd.
The court held a brief hearing on the matter at which Officer Gibson, the
arresting officer, testified. The court issued a written decision in which it held
that the defendant's arrest was not supported by probable cause and granted
the defendant's motion to suppress. The State filed a timely interlocutory
appeal. Appellant's Brief, at 1-3. (internal citations omitted).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Generally
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a trial
de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner,
121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or statute is a
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question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4
P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000).
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1 prqvides that the following judgments and orders are
appealable from a magistrate to a district court: "(a) A final judgment of conviction; (b) By a
defendant only, from an order granting or denying a withheld judgment on a verdict or plea of
-

guilty; ( c) An order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint; (d) An order granting a motion to

suppress evidence in a misdemeanor criminal action; (e) An order denying a motion for new
trial; (f) An order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or the
state; (g) Any order, judgment or decree in a special criminal proceeding in which an appeal is
provided by statute; (h) Any order holding a person in contempt of court other than those
contempts defined in Rule 42(a); (i) An interlocutory order when processed in the manner
provided by Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and accepted by the district court," (Emphasis
added).
"When an exercise of discretion is involved, this Court conducts a three step analysis (1)
whether the trial court perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of reason."

Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902, 950 P.2d 1237, 1241 (1997).
B. Suppression
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State

v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -- PAGE 4

000143

----

-------

"\Vhen reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. 3 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal determination of
whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689,
692 (1999).

ANALYSIS
In this appeal, the State asserts that "the trial court erred in concluding that Hunter's
arrest was not supported by probable cause." Appellant's Brief, at 3. "The trial court erred
because, as a matter of law, the evidence available to the officer at the time of the arrest
supplied probable cause for Hunter's arrest." Id.
In his decision, the magistrate framed the issue before him: "It is clear the breath test
was obtained after the defendant's arrest. The investigative detention had ended at that point. If
the arrest was supported by probable cause the breath test is admissible. If the arrest was not
supported by probable cause the breath test is a product of an illegal arrest and must be
suppressed." Decision and Order, at 2.
"It is clear Officer Gibson relied heavily on the defendant's failure of the HGN test in

making his decision to arrest. 4 Officer Gibson testified he places more importance on that test
because the subject cannot practice for the test. This does not comport with the applicable law
concerning the reliability of the HGN test. The HGN test is a reliable indicator of impairment
only if corroborated by other field sobriety tests." Id.

3See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.").
.
4Actually, Officer Gibson, who testified that he had conducted "several hundred" DUI investigations, testified that
"I just have to take into account everything that I am seeing, but the eyes are ... J factor that into a little bit more ..
. it's just a ... body function they have no control over." November 7, 2011 Hearing Transcript, at 14, 18.
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The magistrate cited State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881 (1991) for the proposition that
"in conjunction with other field sobriety tests, a positive HGN test result does supply probable
cause" for an arrest, standing alone that result does not provide positive proof of DUr, because
many other factors may cause nystagmus." Id., at 2-3.
The magistrate found that "the other field sobriety tests not only failed to corroborate the
HGN test, they completely contradicted it. The defendant demonstrated virtually no impairment
when performing the one leg stand and no impairment at all when performing the walk and tum
test. The results of those tests rendered the HGN test unreliable as a matter of law. The
remaining factors considered by the officer, even taken together, fail to rise to the level of
probable cause to support an arrest." Id., at 3.
The State argues that "[t]he evidence presented to the court in the form of the police
reports and the arresting officer's testimony provided probable cause to arrest Hunter for driving
under the influence as a matter oflaw." Appellant's Brief, at 6.
"Probable cause for an arrest exists where an officer possesses information that would
lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
presumption that a person they have placed under arrest is guilty of a crime. Probable cause is
not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction. Rather, probable cause deals
with the factual and practical considerations on which reasonable and prudent persons act. The
court must judge the facts against an objective standard when evaluating an officer's actions.
That is, whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would
warrant a reasonable person in holding the belief that the action taken was appropriate." State v.

Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 779, 275 P.3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations
omitted).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER -- PAGE 6

000145

...

The question before this Court is whether Officer Gibson possessed probable cause to
believe that Hunter had been driving under the influence at the time he was arrested, which was
before he was administered the breath tests. In other words, whether Officer Gibson, at the time
of his arrest of Hunter "possess[ ed] information that would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that" Hunter was guilty of a
crime.
"Idaho Code § 18-8004(1) makes it a crime 'for any person who is under the influence
of alcohol ... to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state ...
upon public or private property open to the public.'" Martinez-Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 5.
"This Court has had numerous occasions to determine whether the findings of fact in a
particular case constitute probable cause to arrest under suspicion of driving under the influence.
In some instances, we have found probable cause where the defendant had driven erratically,
emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech, and admitted to consuming alcohol . . .
Under other circumstances, we have found reasonable suspicion on similar facts." MartinezGonzalez, 275 P.3d at 5-6.

There was little testimony given during the suppression hearing, since the parties had
already stipulated to the factual content contained in Officer Gibson's police report. See
November 7, 2011 Suppression Hearing Transcript, at 8 ("[T]he parties are willing to stipulate
to admission of the police report as an exhibit ... in lieu of putting an officer on the stand and
having him re-hash what his reports says."). See also Stipulated Admission of Police Reports.
According to the police report, at the time of Hunter's arrest, Officer Gibson was in
possession of the following facts with which to find probable cause that Hunter had been driving

.

under the influence: (l) he observed him for a distance driving at night with his headlights off;

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 7

000146

· ..

(2) "he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and Mark
admitted to drinking;" (3) "he did observe nystagmus in Mark's eyes;" (4) "Mark stated that he
consumed [three] Vodka tonics;" (5) "[w]hile speaking to Mark, I could smell the odor of an
alcoholic beverage coming from his person. I noticed that Mark's eyes were glassy and
bloodshot. Mark stated that he was not taking any medications and did not have any physical
impairments. Mark stated he did not have any recent head injuries or eye problems. I conducted
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Both of Mark's eyes did not pursue smoothly, had distinct
and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation and nystagmus onset before 45 degrees;" (6)

"r

instructed and demonstrated the one leg stand test. Mark swayed during the test;" and (7) "I
checked Mark's eyes a second time and he had the same scoring errors as the fIrst time." Boise
Police Report - Driving Under the Influence (DR 2011-108828).
At the time Officer Gibson placed Hunter under arrest, he knew that Hunter had been
driving for a while without his headlights on at night, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, there
was an odor of alcohol coming from him and his vehicle, he admitted to having consumed three
vodka tonics, he twice failed the nystagmus test (in the absence of taking any medications or
possessing any physical impairments, recent head injuries, or eye problems), and he swayed
during the one leg stand test.
In the Court's view, pursuant to the guidance set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in

Martinez-Gonzalez, 5 Officer Gibson possessed information that would lead a person of ordinary

SSee Martinez-Gonzalez, 275 P.3d at 5-6 ("[W}e have found probable cause where the defendant had driven
erratically, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech, and admitted to consuming alcohol ... officers had
probable cause where defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, had bloodshot eyes, seemed
confused, and a witness opined she was highly intoxicated ... probable cause established where driver weaved in
and out of his lane, smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, had bloodshot eyes, and admitted to drinking ...
[probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion:] defendant was speeding before being pulled over, emitted a strong
odor of alcohol, and admitted to consuming alcohol ... officers observed open beer cans in the vehicle where
Martinez-Gonzalez sat in the driver' seat ... [he] had slightly glazed eyes and slurred speech ... an odor of alcohol
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care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that Hunter had been
driving under the influence. In other words, Officer Gibson had probable cause to arrest Hunter
for driving under the influence.
The magistrate correctly noted that State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488,
491 (1991) states "in conjunction with other field sobriety tests, a positive HGN test result does
supply probable cause for arrest, standing alone that result does not provide proof positive of
DUI, because many other factors may cause nystagrnus.,,6

However, that was not all the

evidence Officer Gibson relied upon. The Court does not agree with the magistrate's legal
conclusion, which is freely reviewed here, that "[t]he remaining factors considered by the
officer, even taken together, fail to rise to the level of probable cause to support an arrest."
Decision and Order, at 3. The magistrate focused too narrowly on the language of Garrett.
Hunter argues "if a suspect passes the field sobriety tests, the officer's reasonable
suspicion of a law violation is dispelled." Respondent's Brief, at 3. However, even assuming
that this assertion oflaw is correct/ it is not factually accurate here. Hunter (twice) failed the
nystagmus test and he also "swayed" during the one leg stand test. 8

[was] present ... [he] admitted to consuming alcohol ... and [he] drove his vehicle across the parking lot
immediately after the officers advised him not to.").
6"[F]actors other than alcohol in the bloodstream can cause nystagmus. Nystagmus may be congenital, or due to a
variety of factors that affect the brain." 119 Idaho at 881, 811 P.2d at 491.
7See, e.g., State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183, 125 P3d 536, 539 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]he suspicion of DUI ...
was removed when Wigginton performed satisfactorily on the sobriety testes] .... ").
80fficer Gibson conducted three field sobriety tests on Hunter: horizontal gaze nystagmus CHON), walk and turn,
and one leg stand. He assessed Hunter six points for the HGN (decision points four or more), zero points for the
walk and tum (decision points two or more), and one point for the ,one leg stand (decision points two or more). See
DUI Supplement (DR# J08-828). A "decision point" has been defined as indicating "a possibility of intoxication."
See Hoganv. State, 2010 WL2367497, *5 (Tex. Ct. App.).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the district court hereby reverses the magistrate's
decision granting Hunter's suppression·motion. 9 This case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this memorandum decision and order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

?:-<{-\/0

day of March 2013.

~t~tka. )h'c~

Kathryn A. 31iCiden

Senior District Judge

9"As the defendant's arrest was not supported by probable cause, and the breath test is a product of that arrest, the
defendant's motion to suppress the breath test is hereby, GRANTED." Decision and Order, at 3.
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